Risk based capital allocation by Marko Danon & László Áron Kóczy





In this paper, we focus on the economic research of corruption. In the first part, we define cor-
ruption, types of corruption, its factors and ways to measure it. This section brings together vari-
ous definitions by notable authors of this domain, such as Begovic, Tanzi, Mauro or Lambsdorff. 
Before moving to the second section, we are presenting definitions, typologies and factors already 
researched by acclaimed authors. In the second part, we focus on the channels by which corruption 
transmits its effects through the economy. This section consists of two major sub-parts, the first one 
in which we take part in a vivid scientific discussion with the ‘’apologists’’ of corruption, i.e. with 
those economists who underline positive roles of corruption. In the second sub-part of the second 
section, as a logic continuation of the previous sub-part, we are listing three important conse-
quences of rampant corruption in one economy: consequences to economic growth, foreign direct 
investments and economic efficiency. Major contribution of this paper is compilation of significant 
scientific discoveries in the area, as well as bringing new arguments in the discussion on the eco-
nomic consequences of corruption. The paper uses traditional approach of the New institutional 
economics (NIE), by underlining the importance of governance, transaction costs and rent seeking. 
Key words: corruption, institutional capacities, new institutional economics, transaction costs, 
FDI
1. Introduction
Corruption has become one of the major economic issues of our time, up to the point 
where we consider this phenomenon as one of the most important obstacles to the devel-
opment. However, the economic research of corruption is relatively new. It is only in the 
Susan Rose Ackerman’s article ‘’Economics of corruption’’ that corruption has become a 
subject of one serious economic work. Ackerman’s work cannot be fully comprehended 
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out of the scientific framework set up by the school of public choice and Gary Becker. 
This economist has shed light on the problem in his famous 1968 article ‘’Crime and 
Punishment’’. He has focused a special economic interest on one form of crime, i.e., 
on corruption; by modeling the costs of the crime and costs of the penal system for one 
society. 
Corruption itself does not belong only to the economic domain. This problem can also be 
approached from the aspects of law, criminology, sociology, and other sciences. However, 
we research corruption on the grounds of the economic methodology. As an economic 
problem, corruption can be researched on two levels: macroeconomic (for instance what 
is the role of corruption within one economy) and microeconomic (for example, what are 
the incentives for one economic agent to take part in one corruptive activity). Our meth-
odology has mostly a macroeconomic optic of this problem, because we want to see the 
concrete consequences of corruption for one economy. 
For these reasons, we will ask the following questions: what is corruption? Can we ap-
proach this problem by using strictly the economic methodology? Which agents take part 
in a corruptive activity? What is the role of the state? Why and how is corruption embed-
ded in one economic system? Which are the economic consequences of corruption?
In order to give an adequate answer to these questions, we are going to present a paper 
divided on two sections, which will be divided on several sub-sections further on. In the 
first section, we will present the definitions, factors, typology and different measures 
of corruption. In this part we wish to describe what corruption is per se, which factors 
contribute to its development, what kinds of corruption there are, and how are we able 
to measure this problem. In contrast with the first chapter, in the second section we try 
to answer how does corruption affect one economy, how does it transmit its effects, and 
does it have only negative, or maybe some positive aspects too? We believe that these 
two sections are deeply complementary, whereas the first one tries to describe corruption, 
and the second tries to situate it inside an economic context. In the both sections, we will 
heavily rely on the contemporary literature and econometric findings.
2. Definitions, factors, typology and measurement of 
corruption
2.1 Definition of corruption
What is corruption? Is it a cultural phenomenon or not? Can corruption be understood by 
every human being the same way? As Rose Ackerman (2004) puts it, corruption is a term 
whose meaning shifts with the speaker. So how can we use the economic methodology in 
a domain where not all of the economic agents are ready to cooperate, because of the fact 
that their activities are condemnable by the society? 29
Historically, it was considered that corruption is a phenomenon of the corrosion of the 
social material. This means that it was a question of morality. As moral is too vague of 
a concept, we have to search for another, more stable definition. For example, Begović 
(2007, p. 51) offers a very elegant solution. According to Begović, corruption can be 
defined as a behavior that spreads away from a certain norm; whereas the norm is defined 
as a set of legislative, public interest or public opinion criteria. This elegant solution has 
at least two major problems. First, there is an institutional problem: there are different 
judicial interpretations of corruption, which treats the notion of corruption the different 
way. A problem linked with this one is that the law system is a human – built, social sys-
tem. This means that it is prone to promulgation of certain laws that are not favorable in 
diminishing corruption, but on the contrary, they aggravate it. Secondly, corruption can 
not be approached only from the judicial point of view. There has to be more sociological 
and economical explications. 
A more comprehensive definition is proposed by Tanzi (1998). Corruption, according 
to Tanzi (1998, pp. 6-7), exists if there is an intentional violation of the principle of im-
partiality in the process of the decision making in order to appropriate a benefice. Tanzi 
also adds that corruption is an abuse of the public power for private benefits. We shall 
underline five important implications drawn from these definitions: 
1.  Principle of impartiality – interpersonal relations should not have any importance in 
the decision making process. Any other behavior raises doubts of corruptive activities. 
2.  Differentiation of corruption from other forms of abuse – corruption is not extortion 
or fraud, stricto sensu. There has to be two sides in consent for a corruptive activity to 
take place.
3.  Corruption  is  not  only  a  public  sector  phenomenon  –  it  exists  also  in  private 
organizations
4.  Not every corruptive activity is connected to bribe – the benefit does not always have to 
be material. Bribe is only a specific form of a corruptive ``tax``
5.  Corruption is a transaction – between the corruptor and the corrupted 
 
2.2 Factors of corruption
As for the definition, there is a number of typologies of corruption. We are going in this 
section to present some of the most important. 
Begović (2007, pp. 135) proposes the following factors:
1.     Rents
2.     Size of the state
3.     Incitation to the public functionaries  
4.     Pressure from the civic society
5.     Extent of democracy
6.     Culture and tradition
7.     Economic (in) equality30
Johan Graf Lambsdorff (2005a, p.14) proposes a similar typology:
1.					Size of the state and decentralization
2.					Institutional quality
3.					Competition






7.3				Corruption in the neighboring countries
7.4				Percentage of the women in the public institutions
 
Jean Cartier Bresson (2008, p. 63) proposes this typology:
1.						Economic causes
1.1    Information asymmetry
1.2    Extent of discretionary power
1.3    Rent seeking
2.					Political causes









3.3				Public approval of corruption
Mauro (1997) focuses on the size of the state and those government politics that provoke 
rent seeking activities. For example, according to Mauro, if the regulations are omni-
present and if the functionaries have a large set of discretionary powers in hands, the 
economic agents will be incited to offer them bribes so they might obtain certain rents. If 
the regulations are too complicated, the absence of transparence and the rents coming out 
of government politics, represent a trigger factor of corruption. When it comes to the rent 
seeking, Mauro shows the origins of this phenomenon. The first origin is the commercial 
barriers. For instance, these barriers might take the form of the quantitative restrictions 
of the imports, under pretext of protection of domestic businesses. In his article (1997) 
Mauro shows a statistically significant relation between the level of openness and corrup-
tion. Some other sources of rents might be subventions, price control systems, even fixed 
exchange rates in some extremely corruption ridden economies. Mauro also stipulates 
that certain economies might suffer from corruption if they are rich in natural resources 
and poor in terms of institutional quality. Finally, Mauro underlines the importance of 
the sociological factors, such as the ethnic or linguistic fragmentation of a country. This 31
might be an important source of clientelism, particularly in those countries that have 
weak democratic and regulatory institutions.    




4.					Public procurement at prices different from market ones







6.6				Positive example from the leaders
Our idea is that major factors of corruption are: level of economic openness, size of rents 
and level of complicatedness of regulations. The first factor, level of economic openness, 
is often approximated by share of the sum of exports and imports in the nation’s GDP. It 
reflects the economic willingness to trade with the exterior, and it is normally correlated 
with importance of the trade barriers. Economies with high barriers (import or export 
ones) are often affected by high corruption, because of difficulties to enter such a mar-
ket. In these situations, exporters might have to pay to obtain ‘’exporting subventions’’ 
(even the exchange rate might be altered by discretionary decisions for some companies), 
and importers might have to pay very high prices due to importing restrictions provoked 
very often by lobbying of domestic producers (who tend to be monopolists themselves). 
Therefore, the level of economic openness is in the same time an indicator and a factor 
of corruption. 
As mentioned by various authors, rents have an important role in causing corruption. It is 
because of the possibility of certain economic agents to attribute parts of the social wealth 
through a discretionary decision. Finally, complicated regulations sometimes seem to be 
meant to increase the costs of the legal operating within an economic system, as we are 
presenting on the figure 1. 
2.3 Typology of corruption
As for the typology, we will present the typologies proposed by the following authors. 
Begović (2007, p. 75) proposes the following types of corruption:
1.  Corruption without collusion – where there is no collusion (agreement) be-
tween the corruptor and the corrupted agent. This type of corruption ex-
ists mostly in the public institutions, where the employees ask certain 
material or immaterial benefits from the beneficiaries, in order to procure 
them with certain resources. 32
2.  Corruption with collusion – where there is an agreement between the corrup-
tive parties. Whilst the first type of corruption is effectively extortion, 
corruption with collusion represents a voluntary pact.  
3.  Centralized vs. decentralized corruption – where the difference between the 
two represents the hierarchical level of a corruptive person or a group. 
For example, a highly centralized corruption is where the president and 
clique, make ask for ``voluntary contributions`` from the economic 
agents of some particular country. The decentralized corruption is the 
most common one – for instance the one that appears in various govern-
ment, health or education institutions.
4.  Administrative corruption vs. the state capture – difference between the two 
is situated at the level of institutional regulations. According to Begović 
(2007, p. 99), the administrative corruption is linked to the execution of 
certain rules. Put simply – whilst the rules of the game rest intact, their 
application is altered. The state capture is where the rules of the game 
are changed in order to be more convenient for one or various economic 
agents that have influenced this particular change. Needless to say; the 
latter type is difficult to detect and to determine its particular scope, be-
cause it tends to embed into the economic and political system. 
Tanzi (2000) proposes the following typology:
1.	Bureaucratic (administrative) vs. the political (state capture)
2.	Materialized thru the cost reduction vs. materialized by the increase of benefits 
3.	Initiated by the corruptor or the corrupted
4.	Centralized vs. decentralized
5.	Financial vs. non financial bribing
Lambsdorff (2005a) proposes the following typology:
1.  Market corruption – This is essentially a competitive corruption, with the 
rules of the corruptive game known to the general public. 
2.  Parochial corruption – As opposed to the previous type, a corruption with a 
smaller degree of transparency, where the rules of the game are known to 
a limited number of economic agents. 
1.4  Measuring corruption
The importance of measuring corruption is vast: what is not measurable is not under-
standable and thus solvable. But, by its nature, corruption is hardly quantifiable. The best 
known indices that we have at disposal are the World Governance Indicators, compiled by 
the World Bank, and the Corruption Perception Index, which is made by the Transparency 
International (TI). Some less known – and less direct – are the Opacity Index, made by 
the PricewaterhouseCoopers, Nations in Transit by Freedom House, Bribe Payers Index 
(TI), World Values Surveys, etc. The TI`s Corruption Perception Index is up today the 33
most comprehensive and the most direct measurement of corruption available. The World 
Governance Indicators is an index on governance, which gives notes of most countries 
in the world in 6 different sectors, of which one is corruption. It is important to notice 
that these indicators are actually perceptions of economic agents working and/or living in 
selected countries. This is a serious limitation to the quality of these indices, which than 
raises doubts on its aptness to measure thoroughly corruption. There are generally four 
limitations of these two major indices:
1.  Perceptions – whose perception, and of what? Did the economic agent that 
states a certain perception really encounter corruption? Is it engaged in 
corruption? The indices do not differ political from administrative (petty) 
corruption, which too blurs the precision of these instruments.
2.  Standardization – whereas we use the indices to measure corruption in one 
country, we also use them to compare countries. But, as the business cul-
ture differs from country to country, so does the perception of corruption. 
This leads to the reduced precision of the indices.
3.  Number of base indicators – most of these indicators is composite, which 
means that they are being compiled out of a number of certain base indi-
cators, such as the World Values Surveys or the Opacity Index. However, 
most of the countries are not noted on the yearly basis, which alters the 
quality of the overall indices on the year – to – year basis. 
4.  Transparency – whilst the composite indices are compiled the transparent 
way, this is not always the case of the base indicators. 
3. Inefficience of the institutions and corruption. Influence 
of corruption on the economy
3.1 Is corruption tonic or toxic?
Many authors like Cazurra (2008) claim that corruption may be positive for the economy. 
In the academic circles, especially in the 80’s, some economists have been comparing 
corruption to a lubricant that makes the ‘’economic wheels’’ turning around. In this paper 
we will present the main arguments of the apologists of corruption, and afterwards we 
will try to refute them. 
The first apologist argument (A): if the regulations aren’t optimal or are inefficient, cor-
ruption helps to escape from its application. In the post-socialist economies, corruption 
had the deregulation role. In this way, the barriers for market entry were neutralized, 
which allowed stronger competition. Nevertheless, we think that this argument does not 
hold, because of three reasons: 1) costs, 2) integrity of public policies, 3) incitation to the 
bureaucrats to complicate the regulations further on. 34
As for the costs, we make difference between two types of imposed costs. First of all, 
by bribing the bureaucrats, the economic agents are paying for obtaining a service for 
which these bureaucrats were already paid by their salary. This is why we think that the 
‘’institution’’ of bribe is an irreparable economic loss of resources that could have been 
used in productive activities. Second type of cost that we refer to is the transaction costs. 
Escaping to respect the inefficient regulations can boost the economic efficiency in the 
short term. In the long term, it makes the regulation disappear, by creating a situation in 
which the economic agents are forced to ‘’muddle’’ through a non regulated institutional 
system. In this kind of situation, the transaction costs tend to elevate, which leads to a 
smaller number of transactions on the market, with further repercussions on the level of 
specialization and finally on the economic efficiency. So, basically, even if it looks as if 
corruption may be positive for efficiency in the short term, it is negative in the long run. 
The integrity of the public policies is harmed when they are executed selectively. By the 
integrity of the public policies we think of: arbitrariness of the regulation application 
(where the integrity represents the application of all the regulations) and the quality of 
the state interventionism. As for the first point, the corruptive activities make the arbi-
trariness more important because a lower transparence, where the decision makers can 
choose freely which regulations to apply. As for the interventionism policies, the same 
reason, lack of transparence, makes public projects less reliable. The first cause is that the 
projects (especially in infrastructure) are more prone to higher costs and a less significant 
quality in presence of high corruption.
The third remark, cited by Habib and Zurawicki (2001, p. 4), stipulates that if one institu-
tional system is ‘’sclerotic’’, it will generate corruption, because the economic agents will 
be incited to escape to apply the regulations. However, the response from the system will 
not be a simplification of the rules of the game; but on the contrary, it will complicate the 
regulations further on. It will do so to make possible to elevate the potential bribes. So, 
corruption generates corruption. We can illustrate our point by the following algorithm.   
Start of the 
process
Documents 
needed for the 









Permit obtained End of the process Yes
No
Yes No
Figure 1: Algorithm of process of obtaining a permit
If the necessary documentation for obtaining a permit is valid, this permit will be issued. 
If the costs for obtaining the documentation are superior to potential bribes, the economic 
agents will be incited to offer them, and the bureaucrats will be incited to accept them. 
So, the only solution might be the simplification of the regulations, so that the process of 
obtaining the documentation becomes less expensive than the potential bribe. Habib and 
Zurawicki stipulate that the system will seldom simplify the regulations, because only 
through its complication it can always make the regular obtaining of the documentation 
more expensive than to bribe the bureaucrats. 35
The second apologist argument (B) is that corruption incites the bureaucrats to work 
on their tasks more efficiently. Highly qualified staff is attracted to work in the public 
administration because of the possibility to ask for the bribes. As the bureaucrats are 
already paid for their work efforts, the economic agents who are bribing them are forced 
to offer some sort of a ‘’voluntary tax’’. The main problem with this tax is that it raises 
the transaction costs, because the size and frequency of the tax are not normally known. 
The only type of corruption that allows the ‘’voluntary tax’’ and low transaction costs 
in the same time is the centralized corruption. This type of corruption centralizes the 
discretionary powers in the hands of a relatively small group. According to Blackburn 
and Forgues – Puccio (2007), in South Korea, for instance, corruption has proven to be 
somewhat beneficial for the development, because the ruling class obviously had the 
intention to centralize all the resources under the single command, and thus to channel 
the development into the promising industries (by using the ‘’voluntary taxes’’ as a mac-
roeconomic tool). However, this is more of an exception than a rule. Except for the case 
of the ‘’enlightened absolutisms’’, the voluntary tax does not end in the public funds, 
which not only raises the transaction costs, but also lowers the quality of public services 
and infrastructure. In case of decentralized corruption, the position of a corruptive agent 
is substantially worse – if an economic agent decides to offer a bribe to a bribe solicitor 
(the bureaucrat for instance), it may end in being blackmailed by the same bribe solicitor, 
which raises the transaction costs over the acceptable level for most agents. 
Another problem of this argument is that the bureaucrats may work more efficiently – but 
only for those agents who are ready to bribe them. It should not go unobserved that, even 
if the bureaucratic system is able to cut the waiting lines – and thus improve the resource 
allocation – the public resources are delivered not to those who merit, but to those who are 
specialized in corruptive activities (in terms of financial situation and the social capital).  
Finally, the last good known argument (D) is that the superior levels of governance and 
low levels of corruption can be reached only in developed countries. Au contraire, ac-
cording to Kaufman (2005, p. 86), the good governance and the low corruption are not a 
luxury, but a necessity for the development. There are many countries that still haven’t 
reached the high development, but they have already substantially lowered their levels 
of corruption. The best known cases are Botswana in Southern Africa, Chili in Latin 
America and Slovenia in Central Europe. The example of these three countries is flagrant, 
as they are, in terms of governance as measured by the WGI, far in advance comparing 
to their respective regions.   
Corruption can substantially increase the efficiency, especially in terms of better resource 
allocation and cutting down the waiting lines. However, in the long term, the effect of a 
devastation of the rules of the game leads to a permanent dissolving of the system, which 
in turn increases the transaction costs.
3.2 The economic effects of corruption
In this section, we will show three economic domains, normally affected by corruption. 
These are: the efficiency, the growth and the foreign direct investments. 36
3.2.1 The efficiency and corruption
The efficiency drops as a consequence of four reasons: drop in specialization, barriers to 
competition, incapacity to protect the lender and the indirect costs.
As for the first reason, our argumentation is based upon a double presumption: that every 
exchange needs a contract, and that the decrease in level of exchange leads to a decrease 
in specialization. We stipulate that corruption reduces the quality of the judicial insti-
tutions (which is why the contracts are not solid anymore), which raises the business 
uncertainty, consequently the transaction costs lift, which makes the economic agents to 
abstain from all but only necessary market exchanges. In turn, the level of specialization 
drops, leading to a lesser efficiency. 
The second reason is a rise in competition barriers. Corruption affects competition in two 
ways. The first way is that the institutional fragility makes the transaction costs higher. In 
corruption free countries, the economic agents, because of low transaction costs, have the 
ability to change partners very often. Contrary to this, in corruption ridden economies, the 
rational agents should be incited to form partnerships, in order to protect themselves from 
high transaction costs. As a consequence, these partnerships are difficult to join for the 
outsiders, and difficult to quit for the insiders. This results in the fact that the membership 
in these partnerships is often rewarded in a cut in a certain monopoly, but paid by long-
standing loyalty to the alliance, and a prime paid to every transaction committed with a 
partner. From the outsider point of view, the fact that it is difficult to join a partnership, 
leads to the fact that the outsider enterprises, especially the foreign ones, have high un-
institutionalized entry barriers to the market. It should not be forgotten that even to form 
a partnership it takes year of investing in seeking a right partner, which also constitutes a 
considerable economic loss of resources, otherwise usable in productive activities.
As for the third reason, it is not possible to keep the credit system, because the law and 
economic system is incapable of protecting a lender. In this kind of system, these are the 
borrowers who are protected, because they are not forced to return the resources they 
have borrowed, because the judicial system is unstable. This incites the creditors to raise 
the cost of the credit, which in turn raises the business risk, makes business ventures more 
expensive, raises the costs of investments, raises the general price level, and all in all, 
lessens the efficiency.      
There are three indirect costs that affect the efficiency. The first are the costs of the cor-
ruptive transaction. As corruption is normally illegal, the partners in this activity are not 
protected by the court of justice. This is why they have to protect their ‘’contractual’’ 
interests themselves. In other words, they have to find a partner for their activity and to 
negotiate with him. As normally there is no ‘’beaten track’’ in finding a partner, nor in ne-
gotiation, this activity provokes a considerable loss in resources. Second type of indirect 
costs is the opportunity costs, the costs spent at rent seeking, that could have been used 
in productive activities. Third type of indirect costs, according to Begović (2007, p. 303), 
are the costs of property rights protection. In a country with a frail judiciary system, the 
economic agents are forced to protect their property themselves, which augments their 
costs (for instance, they have to hire the physical protection) 37
3.2.2 The growth and corruption
The second consequence is the growth. There are many authors who underline the sig-
nificant connection between the economic growth and corruption. For instance, Pellegrini 
and Gerlagh (2004, p.7) show the significance of corruption on the growth. The regres-
sion they have obtained is the following:
Figure 2: Corruption and growth 
It seems that the rise in corruption leads to a drop in the growth rate levels. Begović (2007, 
p. 303) differs two factors of growth – the one that is the consequence of the growth of 
the engaged resources (population, investments) and the second which makes the factor 
productivity higher (institutional factors, investments in the human capital, etc). This 
author also makes difference between three channels by which corruption affects directly 
the level of corruption: the investments, the investments in the human capital and the 
political stability. Lambsdorff (2005b) shows the link between corruption and the pro-
ductivity. He stipulates that corruption diminishes the factor productivity. Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh (2004) show the significance of the following factors for the growth: invest-
ments, education, commercial openness, political instability and corruption. We stipulate 
that corruption affects the growth on both direct and indirect way: apart from rending the 
institutional system instable, corruption lessens the quality of the other factors – educa-
tion, investments in public infrastructure, political stability, commercial openness, etc. 
It is a veritable vicious circle –corruption lessens the government institutions quality, 
by which it widens the social gaps. These two affect the political stability, which creates 
more corruption. This is affirmed in the paper of Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), who 
quantify these relations. According to these authors, among several variables to affect the 38
growth, corruption is not the most important: it is the investments (32%), followed by the 
commercial openness (28%), corruption (19%), political instability (16%) and education 
(5%). Although corruption is not the most directly influential, it most certainly affects 
the other variables. The quality of investments in public infrastructure is lower – the 
projects are more expensive and worse maintained than they could have been in absence 
of corruption1. The commercial openness is lower in corruption ridden countries than in 
corruption free countries for two reasons. Where there is significant corruption, the lo-
cal producers might be interested in pushing for higher commercial barriers, in order to 
protect themselves from the international competition. Second, international competitors 
are reluctant to enter a corruption ridden economy, because they are not familiar with the 
local rules of the game, they have low social capital. Thus the transaction costs for them 
are too high to enter.   
3.2.3 Foreign direct investments (FDI) and corruption
The FDI are especially vulnerable to corruption, but in the same time, they are invaluable 
for the development. If we apply the question of the usefulness of corruption on the FDI, 
we confirm that it has a slightly positive role in the short term and a negative role in the 
long term. Corruption, in the long term, provokes the arbitrariness that abolishes the regu-
lations, and thus increases the transaction costs. Tanzi (1998, p. 586) says that the level of 
uncertainty is directly and negatively linked with the FDI. The uncertainty functions like 
a ‘’voluntary tax’’. The foreign companies know neither the size nor the frequency of the 
imposed ‘’supplementary’’ taxation.
Habib and Zurawicki (2001) distinguish two types of direct investments: the local (LDI) 
and the foreign direct investments (FDI). Their opinion is that, because of the fact that the 
local investors are better informed, the impact of corruption on their business will be less 
important. The two authors made a list of factors who contribute to the level of both kinds 
of investments, wishing to see if corruption is 1) important for investments, and if yes 2) 
does it hurt the LDI and the FDI the same way. The list constitutes the following factors: 
size of the economy (approximated by the GDP), GDP per capita, GDP growth, orienta-
tion towards exports (approximated by the percentage of exports in the GDP), political 
instability, the inflation rate and fiscal position of the country. Their paper confirms the 
two presumptions: it is true that corruption is negatively linked with both types of invest-
ments, and it is also confirmed that the FDI are more affected by the LDI. 
Not only that corruption lowers the general level of the FDI, but its structure is less fa-
vorable for the development. Begović (2007, p. 332) stipulates that in a country where 
corruption is rampant, the international investors will look for the local partners, because 
they are better informed; for it is in this joint venture with the local partners that the inter-
national investors are seeking to lower the transaction costs. However, this solution may 
not be a durable one, because the foreign investors will not be incited to transfer their 
technology to the local partners. Because of this, if corruption is high, the FDI will arrive 
under form of the investments in production of low technology goods and services. This 
1   According to Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) show that corruption elevates the investment expenditure, 
but it lessens the investment quality and that these investments do not have substantial effect on 
growth. 39
has been proven by the research of Smarzynska and Wei (2000). Effectively, these authors 
have shown that high corruption may raise the level of the joint ventures, but also that the 
investors disposing with high technology will avoid the country. 
There is another important question linked with the FDI: which type of corruption affects 
the FDI more – the small (administrative) or grand (political) corruption? Lambsdorff 
(2005b) stipulates that the investors are particularly vulnerable to the impact of the small 
corruption, because this corruption provokes higher uncertainty. For instance, Lambsdorff 
gives empirical evidence that the impossibility to obtain some public services, such as 
the electricity, water or gas2, have a strong negative impact on the investors. It is for 
that reason that Lambsdorff stipulates that the eradication of corruption in infrastructural 
companies will significantly ameliorate the business climate for the foreign investors. 
Finally, Lambsdorff remarks that the 1) high level of corruption lowers the FDI, and that 
2) for a fixed level of corruption, the augmentation of the grand corruption compared to 
the small one, raises the general level of the FDI. One interpretation of this find might be 
that the grand corruption practically transfers the discretionary powers to the high rank 
bureaucrats, who can then personally step into a political trade with the foreign investors. 
Al Sadig (2009) tries to explain the role of corruption in attracting the FDI. At the sample 
of 117 countries, he is trying to observe the different roles of corruption in different insti-
tutional systems. His conclusion is that the decline in corruption for 1% makes the FDI 
per capita increase for about 20%, in all the countries. However, in a model where Al 
Sadig includes the governance variable, corruption effect diminishes, which can be inter-
preted as the fact that the foreign investors prefer the institutional stability to corruption.   
Finally, Robertson and Watson (2004) show the link between the FDI and corruption in-
versely. They are not looking to explain the influence of corruption on the FDI, but on the 
contrary, what kind of effect do the FDI have on corruption. The authors stipulate that the 
rapid afflux of the FDI might raise corruption, but that this effect might take place even if 
there comes to a drop in the FDI. 
Figure 3 : Corruption and the FDI, source : Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004)
2   These services, however, are being delivered by lower rank bureaucrats, and thus we believe that 
it is an example of how the small (petty, administrative) corruption scares off the foreign investors40
For instance, the massive FDI in Ecuador in 2000 have been followed by growth of cor-
ruption of 13%. Au contraire, countries such as Estonia, who had a gradual increase in the 
FDI, also had a gradual drop in corruption. Our interpretation is the following. If the FDI 
grow without forming an institutional system3 in order to welcome these investments, 
the local bureaucrats and politicians might have a possibility to deviate an important 
part of this afflux to their personal accounts. For instance, a country like Nigeria, rich in 
natural resources generally attracts the FDI, but those FDI rarely contribute to growth of 
development.    
5.	 Concluding remarks
We have tried in this paper to focus the attention to the problems of corruption in modern 
economies. In the first part of this paper, our intention was to show what is corruption, 
how does it appear, what aggravates it, how can one measure it. In the second part, our 
intention was to show how corruption transmits its effects through an economy. The fo-
cal point is the transaction costs, whereas the rise in corruption makes those costs more 
important, and thus lowers the overall efficiency of one economy. The body of literature 
presented in the paper confirms our ideas. In spite of the growing body of corruption lit-
erature, there is still a live discussion on the question whether corruption is tonic or toxic 
for the economy, whereas we choose the latter answer.   
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